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The Object as Agent of Mentalization
Themistoklis Katrios
Mentalization, our ability to understand people’s behaviour in terms of
mental states (feelings, thoughts, desires, intentions, etc.), is linked with
our capacity to create symbolic representations of our inner states. From
a psychodynamic point of view this is a developmental achievement re-
lated to adequate maternal care, more specifically to the mother’s mir-
roring function. This proposition has been confirmed by recent experi-
mental evidence. A clinical case is presented showing that the mirroring
function of the therapist, and not his interpretations, helped the
analysand to create symbolic representations of a recent traumatic expe-
rience. Through this experience in the here and now, the analyst may be
able to approach early childhood traumas (described by Peter Fonagy
and others as “procedural memories”) inaccessible to analytic interpre-
tation.
Introduction
B ehind theories of mentalization, which are at present attracting sig-nificant interest in psychoanalytic practice for their reconfigurationof the subject’s relation to the object, lies almost a century of
preparatory psychoanalytic thought. Freud’s description of identification as
contributing significantly to the formation of both the Ego and the Su-
perego1 prepared the ground for the study of the importance of the attributes
of external objects (the parents) for the development of the child’s person-
ality. In Kleinian theory the real parents (external objects) are important
only insofar as they represent universal human attributes (a mother with
breasts, a father with a penis), and because they can survive the child’s ag-
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1. See in particular “Mourning and Melancholia” (1915) and The Ego and the Id (1923).
gressive attacks; the particular characteristics of the parents’ personalities
and their impact on the child’s self are not elaborated. Ferenczi, in his pio-
neering paper “Confusion of Tongues” (1933), took a significant step in
positing the lack of maternal understanding as the main source of childhood
traumas. Following these insights, Winnicott described, with unsurpassed
perceptiveness, the contribution of the psychological attributes of the moth-
er to the development of the child’s self. Initially, for Winnicott, there is no
such thing as a baby, only a nursing couple (“Anxiety” 99). Subsequently, a
sense of self emerges, which both differentiates from and experiences a
sense of continuity within the frame of the relationship with the mother,
whose holding and mirroring capacities help the infant to understand and
represent its own emotional experience as well as that of others (Playing
134).
Perhaps the most important precursor for theories of mentalization is
Wilfred Bion, who, in the early sixties, developed a theory of thinking based
on an elaboration of emotional experience. The raw data of experience (sen-
sations, feelings), which he calls “b” (beta) elements, cannot be tolerated by
the infant and are therefore projected into the mother. Her containing and
reverie (“a” [alpha] function) transforms them into “a” (alpha) elements,
which are the basic units of thinking capable of further elaboration (Bion,
Transformations). These elements are more tolerable and can be internal-
ized by the infant, who in time internalizes the mother’s “a” function.
Mentalization
In the last twenty to thirty years, research in attachment theory and devel-
opmental psychology has demonstrated the importance of external objects
for the organization of the infant’s self, the development of its representa-
tional world and its emotional self-regulation. The work of Peter Fonagy
and others, which seeks to link these findings to insights from post-Kleinian
psychoanalytic theory, has focused on the child’s capacity for “mentaliza-
tion.”
Mentalization has to do with being able to understand people’s behav-
ior in terms of mental states - feelings, thoughts, desires, intentions, etc.
From a cognitive developmental point of view this capacity is innate, while
from a psychodynamic point of view it constitutes a developmental achieve-
ment greatly facilitated by secure attachment (Fonagy and Bateman 72). A
key factor in the development of this capacity is the mirroring function of
the mother, her ability to understand the emotional state of her infant and to
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represent it to him or her through the use of her facial and vocal expressions.
The infant sees itself in its mother’s face, which acts as a signifier for its
emotional experience (signified). The internalization of the mother’s em-
pathic response enables the infant to develop a second-order (symbolic) rep-
resentation of its mind state. Linking the internal state with a perception of
that state outside provides a representation - a symbol - of its internal state,
which corresponds yet is not identical to that state. The playful attitude of
the mother here is crucial. The child’s mental state must be represented suf-
ficiently clearly and accurately by the mother for the child to recognize it,
yet sufficiently playfully for the child not to be overwhelmed by its realness.
In this way the child can ultimately use the mother’s representation of its in-
ternal reality as the seed for its own symbolic thought.
The mother’s expression tempers emotion and the infant may come to
associate the control it has over her mirroring displays with the ensuing pos-
itive change in its own affect state, leading to an experience of the self as a
self-regulating agent. The establishment of second-order representations for
emotion creates the basis for affect regulation and impulse control and pro-
vides the essential building blocks for the child’s later development of the
crucial capacity for mentalization (Fonagy and Bateman 68).
A child’s capacity for mentalization can be tested by its performance on
“false belief tasks,” an example of which is the following. A little ball is
placed in container A in front of a child and an adult. The adult leaves the
room and during his or her absence the ball is transferred to container B.
When the adult returns, a child up to the age of three predicts that the adult
will search for the ball in container B. By the age of four or five, children
do not commit this error any more; they tend to predict that the adult will
look for the ball in container A, because they are able to attribute a false be-
lief to the adult. 
Research findings are providing evidence for the way social interaction
is important in the development of a mentalistic understanding. For exam-
ple, deaf children with hearing parents are delayed in the development of
false belief understanding, unlike deaf children with deaf parents. This
seems to be because deaf parents are native users of sign language, thus ex-
posing their children to normal conversation. Hearing parents of deaf chil-
dren, on the other hand, are less fluent in sign language and therefore their
children are not exposed to complex conversation about everyday events in-
volving people’s actions, beliefs and emotions (Fonagy and Bateman 73).
Attachment theorists have suggested that disturbances within the
mother-child relationship may inhibit the emergence of symbolic thought.
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Recently, empirical evidence has accumulated to suggest that attachment
security with the mother is a good concurrent predictor of metacognitive
capacity in the child. A relation has been demonstrated between attachment
security to the mother and the child’s understanding of emotional states in
a puppet doll (Fonagy, Attachment Theory 100).
The concept of mentalization, it could be said, has always existed in
psychoanalysis. It is present in Freud’s notion of Bindung (linking), Klein’s
formulation of the depressive position, Winnicott’s concepts of holding and
mirroring, and Bion’s ideas of containment and transformation. What is sig-
nificant for psychoanalysis today, however, is the fact that recent experi-
mental evidence is confirming the validity of these psychoanalytic proposi-
tions. 
Clinical case
A 22-year-old single woman, whom I’ll call Mary, came to therapy with de-
pressive symptomatology. She had difficulties in her relationship with her
boyfriend and wanted to break it off, but found it impossible to do so be-
cause of feelings of guilt; the thought of not seeing him again was intoler-
able. She therefore remained in the relationship in spite of the fact that it
didn’t mean anything to her any longer. From the beginning, it was obvi-
ous that the issue of separation or loss was dominant in her psychopatho-
logy.
During the first month of analysis, the patient reported a dream she had
had a little while before she became depressed: “I go out and am walking on
a beach. I realize that in the sand there are millions of little human beings,
all dead. I take them up in my hand and look at them . . . I am alone in the
world . . . I don’t want to live. I start sinking in the sand . . . the sun is big,
bright . . . I feel terribly lonely.” It was not possible to interpret this dream
at the time. However, in a later period of the therapy she remembered it and
realized that she herself had killed those little people and consequently was
sinking into an unbearable loneliness. When other people disappoint her she
responds with intense hate, wants to challenge them, to belittle them (“little
human beings”). They cease to exist for her at the price of isolation, which
equals psychic death. It became clear, as the analysis progressed, that her
depression was related to the destruction of the external object.
A dream from the third period depicts a basic character trait of this pa-
tient: “I am flying above the world and trying to keep a certain distance. But
I am afraid that if I go too high, I will stop existing.” She related this flying
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to the effort she kept making as a child to become invisible. She always felt
uncomfortable in the presence of others, and spent hours in a closet, the on-
ly place where she felt some security. The following comment is revealing:
“The distance I keep from others is a problem. I feel it protects me from
pain, but it is self-negating . . . as when I was a child . . . I don’t feel . . . I
don’t feel.” It is this distance, kept both from herself and from others, which
formed her central character trait.
Towards the end of the first year, in an early afternoon session, she
started by asking me: “Do you find time to eat?” I replied that I do. She con-
tinued: “Because I don’t . . . I come straight from work and don’t have time
to eat.” She went on talking about various topics and at some point referred
to her mother, who was accusing her of always “crying and moaning and
never being satisfied,” ever since she was a baby. I said to her that perhaps
she had cried because she was hungry. She replied that that was what the
doctor had said. They had called a doctor to examine her and had been told
that the baby wasn’t being sufficiently nourished. She herself, of course,
could not remember any of this, but was informed about it much later by her
mother.
We now know that experiences of the first years of life are registered in
the so-called “procedural memory,” described by cognitive scientists in re-
lation to the non-conscious use of past experience. Fonagy et al. explain this
as follows:
There is general agreement that the memory system is at least of a
dual nature with two relatively independent, neurologically and psy-
chologically homogeneous systems underpinning it. In addition to the
autobiographical memory, which is at least in part accessible to
awareness, an important additional component to memory is a non-
voluntary system that is implicit, principally perceptual, nondeclara-
tive, and nonreflective . . . It is possible that it is, at least in certain re-
spects, more dominated by emotional and impressionistic information
than its autobiographical counterpart . . . The procedural knowledge
that it contains is accessible only through performance. It manifests
itself only when the individual engages in the skills and operations in-
to which knowledge is embedded. Given these features, it seems like-
ly that the schematic representations postulated by attachment and
object-relations theorists are most usefully construed as procedural
memories, the function of which is to adapt social behavior to specif-
ic interpersonal contexts. (41)
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These non-conscious procedural memories, in other words, organize our
“way of being with the other,” and may come to be enacted in the trans-
ference. Mary comes to the session feeling hungry, and I am the one (my
early afternoon session) responsible for her starvation. Mary seems to have
had a series of traumatic experiences in her childhood. The insufficient
nourishment, the very limited empathic capacity of her mother, the behav-
ior of her father (I refer to him later), the long hours in a closet, all these
comprise a picture of what Masud Khan has called “cumulative trauma.” It
becomes increasingly evident to me that these experiences have contributed
significantly to the formation of her basic character trait, namely the dis-
tancing from herself and from others.
It is significant that at the end of his life, Freud had been working to-
wards a very similar view of traumatic experiences inaccessible to memory.
About fifty years after his description of trauma as retroactive
(Nachträglichkeit), he revised the notion of childhood trauma (before the
age of five), and wrote:
The [traumatic] experiences in question are as a rule totally forgotten,
they are not accessible to memory . . . They relate to impressions of a
sexual and aggressive nature, and no doubt also to early injuries to the
ego (narcissistic mortifications) . . . The effects of traumas are of two
kinds, positive and negative. The former are attempts to bring the
trauma into operation once again - that is, to remember the forgotten
experience . . . to revive it . . . The negative reactions follow the op-
posite aim: that nothing of the forgotten traumas shall be remembered
and nothing repeated . . . These negative reactions too make the most
powerful contributions to the stamping of character. (Moses and
Monotheism 74-76). 
What Freud is describing here is an area of the unconscious that is not
repressed, cannot enter the dynamics of representations and is not ap-
proachable by interpretations. As he argues in this same period (the late
1930s), we may gain access to these negative effects of childhood traumas
by the use of constructions (“Constructions in Analysis”). Modern ap-
proaches to this area of the unconscious (the not repressed) include Bion’s
concept of “O” and its transformations (Attention and Interpretation), and
the Botellas’ concept of “accidents of thought” (The Work of Psychic Fig-
urability). 
Mary’s basic character trait did not change at all during the first period
of her therapy. However, her depressive symptomatology subsided, she sep-
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arated from her boyfriend, felt generally better and then decided to interrupt
the treatment, despite my objections. It seemed to me that she was not yet
able to handle experiences of loss, and that she was interrupting the treat-
ment out of fear of deeper involvement in the transference.
Two years later she phoned to tell me that Katie, her sister younger by
ten years, had been killed in a car accident. Shocked by the news, I told her
to come and see me. She came five years later, claiming she had wanted to
cope with the problem herself but kept in mind that if she failed she would
resume therapy. She had left her job and moved to the town where her par-
ents lived to help them with the painful situation. Almost every night she
would dream of her sister in situations where they were both happy and
everything was fine. When, in any of these dreams, the realization struck
that her sister was dead, she was overwhelmed by unbearable anxiety and
woke up. During the daytime, she believed that her sister was living some-
where else and that one day they would be together again.
It was clear that Mary was trying to deny the tragic loss, that the reason
she hadn’t returned to therapy was the fear that I would make her face up to
it. The situation, however, had become overwhelming, and she tried, four
years after Katie’s death, to escape in a new relationship. It is significant that
she came to therapy asking for help with difficulties with her boyfriend,
from whom she wanted to separate but was prevented by guilt, as in the first
period.
In the first sessions we talked about her relationship and soon she man-
aged to break it off, using me as a support. It was inevitable, however, that
the loss of her sister would become the main focus of the treatment. When-
ever I asked her to describe the accident, she would try to avoid it. The de-
tails emerged gradually. Her sister had wanted to go to a nearby village to
meet some friends. Both Mary and her mother didn’t approve, but eventual-
ly Mary changed her mind under pressure from her sister, and managed to
persuade the mother to agree. One of the boys took his father’s car, the ac-
cident occurred and Katie was killed (though nobody else was hurt). Had
Mary not mediated to change the mother’s mind, her sister would still be
alive.
In one session she reported the following dream: 
there is a storm . . . I am in a vehicle which looks like a boat . . . there
are other people in it . . . perhaps my sister too. The vehicle is mov-
ing along something like a riverbed, which is very muddy and leads
to the sea. I try to control it but can’t . . . I look at it from a distance . . .
it rolls over and eventually sinks into the sea . . . there is a sense of
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danger. Some people around are accusing me, saying that it was very
dangerous . . . they are moving towards me in a threatening way. Then
a man, who looks like Poseidon, comes and takes me in his arms and
rescues me. 
Ιt was clear that the dream referred to the accident, and Mary herself
connected the figure of Poseidon with me. I interpreted that she was at-
tempting to undo the tragic event, without success. Her guilt at having en-
couraged her sister to visit her friends was being experienced in a persecu-
tory way. The analyst-Poseidon functioned in a protective and soothing
way. She agreed with the interpretation, but I was left with a feeling that
something was missing from my emotional understanding in relation to her.
I thought that her guilt had deeper roots, and tried to search for them in
competitive feelings towards her sister during childhood - without success.
I told her that there must be something very painful in the accident that is
difficult to reach, that it might be useful to try and describe the accident in
as much detail as possible. With great difficulty and much encouragement,
she began the narrative. The car was driving along a dirt-track (the muddy
riverbed in the dream), it skidded off the road, then rolled over many times.
Katie was killed by being thrown through the windscreen. In spite of the
emotionally charged description, however, I still felt that something was
missing. 
Certain childhood traumas, I have said, cannot be elaborated psychical-
ly, cannot be represented symbolically, leave a void in the network of rep-
resentations. To confront this gap, the analyst’s only resort may be to func-
tion as a mirror of the patient’s internal state - to offer the opportunity for its
“performance” (to use Fonagy et al.’s word) within the context of experi-
ence in relation to the other/object. Interpretations cannot reach such trau-
matic areas. As long as I was interpreting, Mary would agree with me and
we would continue indefinitely without touching the core. I would be func-
tioning like Poseidon, relieving her guilt but leaving the traumatic area in-
tact.
Another dream in the next session seems to move closer to what is at
stake: “I found Katie . . . I embraced her . . . I was worried that she might
see what had happened to her body in the accident. At one point she said to
me: ‘don’t press me . . . don’t press me.’ I moved away and shouted: ‘I was
right . . . I was right.’” I didn’t interpret this dream because I thought that it
would not lead anywhere. It is interesting that I ignored the reference to
Katie’s body in the dream and instead asked her to describe her sister’s fu-
neral. What followed is almost beyond my descriptive capacity, a result of
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her acutely painful hesitation and my own fearful encouragement. Katie’s
chest had been crushed but this was not apparent because her body was cov-
ered with flowers. However, the face . . . her pain was so intense that I feared
she might break  . . . Katie’s face was somewhat flattened . . . the idea that
she might have experienced excruciating pain was unbearable . . . 
The relief provided by the ordeal of this description bore striking re-
sults. The first had to do with the quality of her communications. For the
first time in therapy, she became more intimate and alive, investing her
thoughts with appropriate emotion. She referred to the pregnancy of her
mother with Katie. Much to Mary’s distress, her parents had decided to in-
terrupt the pregnancy, but the doctor managed to persuade them against it.
Mary’s prayers were answered. I thought this communication related to the
deeper roots of her guilty feelings, but didn’t interpret it because what was
important at this moment was the restoration of her relationship with her sis-
ter (her prayers saved her sister). It is important to stress here that this not
only refers to the past, but also reflects her present internal state, which is a
symbolic representation of her mental state. Having survived the traumatic
transferential experience, she realized that her sister was very much alive
inside her. According to Klein in Mourning and its Relation to Manic-
Depressive States, in every case of loss, the survival of the internal object is
at risk. Every mourning process is complicated because we mourn not only
on behalf of ourselves but also on behalf of the object (Segal 70). This is
why the loss of a child is the most difficult case of mourning. Mary had to
experience the pain of her sister, to survive it and discover that her relation-
ship with her was still alive inside her. She could now pass by the cemetery
where Katie was buried without going into a panic. She had ceased, in oth-
er words, to identify with her dead sister and the trauma had lost its atem-
poral and immediate quality (its flash-back quality) and was placed in his-
torical perspective (there and then).
Two weeks later a dream from another session shows more clearly the
deeper roots of Mary’s guilt. “We’re having a celebration at home because
they [the parents] are going to kill Katie, who is suffering from cancer. I’m
trying to persuade them not to do it because she might be cured or die from
another cause.” The fact that there is a celebration before the planned
murder points to Mary’s death wishes against her sister. What is important
here is that this insight didn’t precede the experiencing of trauma and loss;
on the contrary, it came afterwards. In the attempt to identify the factors
that help a patient to change, John Steiner asks the question as to whether
insight precedes mourning or mourning precedes insight. The patient con-
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fronting loss, he argues, finds himself in a quandary: “He cannot take back
the projections unless he can mourn and he cannot let the object go and
mourn it unless he can take back the projections” (1077). In Mary’s case,
it seems, mourning preceded the taking back of her projections (insight).
Her sister was still important for her, her loss filled her with grief, yet she
had gained a degree of freedom to live her own life. The first and most sig-
nificant step towards the recognition of loss and the development of au-
tonomy had taken place. 
Another important development had to do with her relationship with
her father. In the past she had described him as verbally violent, without at-
tributing much significance to this. Now she revealed that he was a “ter-
rorist” (her word), that everybody in the family was terrified of him, and
that she believed he was capable even of killing her. Now for the first time,
she began to stand up to him and told him she would no longer tolerate his
violence. She remembered an incident with a small female dog that was on
heat and had been tied up to be protected from a large male dog in the
neighborhood. Her father had infuriated Mary by untying the dog without
concern for the consequences. I interpreted that she was also angry with me
because I had exposed her to painful feelings without guarantee of a suc-
cessful outcome. The dog incident, in other words, was a symbolic repre-
sentation of her relationship with me. She soon found a boyfriend, which I
interpreted as in part an acting out, an attempt to avoid deeper involvement
with me. 
The shift in her personality, as I have interpreted it, had come about
without the reconstruction of her traumatic childhood events. It was only
through dealing with the recent trauma that the character trait (the distance
from others) could be approached. The therapeutic value of childhood re-
constructions, of course, is still an open debate within psychoanalysis, with
some analysts, such as Harold Blum in his 2003 essay on “Repression,
Transference and Reconstruction,” insisting on the necessity of reconstruc-
tions. Following Fonagy (for example in “Memory and Therapeutic Ac-
tion”), however, I would dispute their utility and put the emphasis on the
here and now analysis of the transference, which constitutes an enactment
of the old experiences mediated by procedural memory.
Conclusion
This case raises many interesting questions: the contribution of early trau-
matic experiences to the formation of the character, the “not repressed” un-
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conscious and how to approach it, the validity of childhood reconstruction
and the analysis of the here and now transference, the experience of the trau-
ma that is followed by insight and not vice versa, and of course the function
of the analyst. Interpretations had a soothing effect but could not reach the
central issue. My feeling of something missing from the puzzle was the
guide in my approach. It reflected Mary’s internal psychic state and acted as
its mirror. This enabled her to experience and describe the trauma, to give it
symbolic representation, which eventually led to the development of the ca-
pacity for mentalization. 
Psychiatrist and Psychoanalytic Psychotherapist
Thessaloniki
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